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NOTES
THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF IN
VITRO FERTILIZATION:
CRYOPRESERVED EMBRYOS FROZEN
IN LEGAL LIMBO
I.

INTRODUCTION

The increased availability of in vitro fertilization has concerned
many legal, philosophical, political, and scientific scholars for the past
decade. 1 New legal and moral issues are a direct result of this
advancement in reproductive technology; for the first time an American
court has had to determine the legal status of cyropreserved embryos. 2
This Note will give an overview of the development of in vitro
fertilization, the impact it has had on society, and will discuss the
constitutional rights to both coital and noncoital reproduction. The first
American case concerning in vitro fertilization and the disposition of
frozen embryos, Davis v. Davis,' will be discussed thoroughly, and
alternative solutions concerning the rights of the donors as well as the
embryos will be explored. The discussion will conclude by analyzing
current legislation regarding innovative reproductive technology, and will
recommend guidelines for future drafters of such legislation.
A. The Development of In Vitro Fertilization
On July 25, 1978, Louise Brown was the first baby to be born
from extracorporeal in vitro fertilization. 4 The technique, as perfected
1. See Lopez, Privacy and the Regulation of the New Reproductive Technologies:
A Decision-Making Approach, 22 FAM. L.Q. 173 (1988); Wilkler, Society's Response
to the New Reproductive Technologies: The Feminist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
1043 (1986); Dickey, The Medical Status of the Embryo, 32 LoY. L. REV. 317 (1986).
2. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library).

3. Id.
4. Drs. Edwards and Steptoe were responsible for the birth of Louise Brown, the
first "test tube baby." Sullivan, Woman Gives Birth to Baby Conceived Outside the
Body, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1979, at Al, col. 5.
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in England by Drs. Edwards and Steptoe, 5 made scientific history. The
birth of this "test tube baby" attracted wide media attention. 6 Although
the ultimate impact of this scientific advancement has yet to be known, the
most obvious consequence of the process of in vitro fertilization is that it
tremendously increases the possibilities for infertile couples to have their
own natural children. 7 A couple who is diagnosed as infertile may be
able to bring their own genetic offspring to term through the use of
extracorporeal fertilization and subsequent implantation.' An infertile
couple also could have a child that is "half' theirs through the use of
surrogate donors of either sperm or eggs.'
Another possibility resulting from the advancement of in vitro
fertilization is that it provides one means by which gay men and women
may have children.'" The process of fertilizing an egg extracorporeally
also permits a vast array of experimentation with human embryos."
Specifically, advances in genetic engineering may result from scientific
5. "Human procreation can be accomplished through a variety of reproductive
technologies that do not involve sexual intercourse." Note, The Need for Statutes
Regulating Artificial Insemination by Donors, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 1055, 1055 (1985)
[hereinafter Note, The Need for Statutes]. Among these techniques are artificial
insemination and in vitro fertilization. The process of in vitro fertilization involves
extracting eggs from a woman and sperm from a man and then fertilizing the eggs in a
culture dish. id. at 1055-58. The fertilized eggs, or human embryos, are then either
implanted immediately in a woman's uterus or frozen in a cryprotectant liquid solution
for implantation at a future date. Kaplan, Fetal Research Statutes, Procreative Rights,
and the 'New Biology : The Interstices of the Law, 21 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 723, 730
(1987). The process of in vitro fertilization had been used on experimental animals for
a number of decades before.it was used for the birth of a human. Dickey, supra note
1.
6. Sullivan, supra note 4, at Al, col. 5.
7. Dickey, supra note 1, at 317.
8. Id. at 319.
9. Id. at 327-28.
10. See Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1508, 1649 (1989). Many lesbian and gay couples are having children through the
use of alternative reproductive means despite the legal barriers that prohibit them from
access to the reproductive techniques. Kolafa, Lesbian Partners Find the Means to be
Parents, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1989, at A13, col. 1.
11. Attanasio, The Constitutionality of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering.
Where Procreative Liberty and Equal Opportunity Collide, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1274,
1277 (1986).
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use of in vitro fertilization. ' Although most of the results seem to be
beneficial, some fear that manipulation or casual experimentation with
human embryos could have negative consequences such as cloning or the
3
creation of genetic hybrids. 1
These innovative reproductive techniques raise many social,
moral, and legal questions. This Note will examine the most pressing: the
legal status of an embryo and the rights of the respective donor-parents.
B. Legal Questions Raised by Cryopreservation of Embryos
Since the advent of cryopreservation of embryos, 4 scholars have
envisioned situations where a couple -undergoing fertilization treatment
will die and leave behind human embryos or where a couple divorces and
disagrees over the disposition of frozen embryos.' 5 Scholars speculated
that under such circumstances, it would be necessary for a third party to
determine the fate of frozen human embryos.6
In 1981, an American couple, the Rios, flew to Australia to
undergo fertilization treatment. 7 An anonymous couple donated three
human embryos to the Rios.'" One embryo was implanted in Mrs. Rios
in an attempt to impregnate her, and the other two were cryopreserved. 19
The couple later died in a plane crash without having attempted
implantation of the remaining embryos or having decided in advance the
12. Id. Genetic engineering is the process of manipulating the genes to have the
desired outcome from the offspring. Id. at 1277-84. For example, if parents wanted a
girl rather than a boy they could manipulate the genes to achieve this goal. Id. at 128 182. More practically, genetic engineers may be able to remove genetically transmitted
diseases. Id. at 1283 n.50.
13. Department of Health and Human Services, Protection of Human Subjects, 45
C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.211 (1989); Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Protection of Human Subjects: HEW Support of Human In Vitro Fertilization and
Embryo Transfer, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,044 (1979) [hereinafter HEW]. The Board
determined that a "human embryo is entitled to profound respect; but this respect does
not necessarily encompass the full legal and moral rights attributed to persons." Id.
14. Cryopreservationof embryos is the process of freezing living embryos in a fluid
solution. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 730. At a later date, the temperature of the solution
is increased to room temperature and the embryos are immediately implanted. Id.
15. Andrews, Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 Loy. L. REV. 357, 405-08 (1986).
16. Id. at 407.
17. Saltarelli, Genesis Retold." Legal Issues Raised by the Cyropreservation of
PreimplantationHuman Embryos, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1021, 1030 (1985).
18. Id.
19. Id. The two remaining embryos were "frozen" for possible use later. Id.
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disposition of the embryos in the case of death?0 This tragedy exposed
the various legal questions raised by the in vitro fertilization process.
For the first time in any country, courts and legislatures were faced with
the complex question of what to do with the "orphaned" frozen
embryos: 1 After much debate, the Australian legislature decided to
donate the frozen embryos to an anonymous recipient.'
Although the
decision of the Australian-legislatui'e is not legally binding in this country,
it generated much curiosity as to how American legislatures would handle
the situation created by these new reproductive techniques. '
Subsequently, the United-States Congress held various House hearings on
the legal implications involving the new reproductive techniques.'
However, no federal statutes were enacted?25
Lacking statutory guidance, American courts have recently been
faced with the difficult task of determining the fate of frozen embryos.'
In Maryville, Tennessee, Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis, a couple
married for nine years, tried repeatedly to have a child. 27 During these
years Ms. Davis suffered five tubal pregnancies.28 Under the advice of
her physician, she undertook surgical treatment which rendered her
incapable of natural conception.29 Still determined to have a child, the
Davis' sought the assistance of Drs. King and Shivers, owners of a
fertilization center.' The couple participated in an in vitro fertilization
program during which Ms. Davis experienced six unsuccessful attempts
20. Id. at 1030-31.
21. Id. at 1030-33.
22. id. at 1032-33.

23. See Alternative Reproduction Technologies: Inplications for Children and
Families, HearingBefore the Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 117-18, 130-31 (1987) [hereinafter Alternative Reproduction Hearing].
24. Id.; see also Human Embryo Transfer. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Investigationsand Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 32 (1984) [hereinafter Human Embryo Hearings].
25. See Alternative Reproduction Hearing, supra note 25, at 133-37. Although the
Select Committee proposed that legislative action should be taken, Congress has yet to
pass any laws on the subject. Id.
26. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library).
27. Smothers, Embryos in a Divorce Case. Joint Property or Offspring?, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 21, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
28. Id.
29. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 3.

30. Id. at 4.
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to bear a child and then temporarily suspended her in vitro fertilization
treatment.31
In 1988, Ms. Davis learned of cryopreservation, where the ova,
which were aspirated and inseminated in the laboratory, could be
frozen.3" Thus, some of the fertilized ova would be implanted and the
remaining ones would be cryopreserved or "frozen" for future
implantation.33 On December 8, 1988, Dr. Shivers extracted nine ova
from Mary Sue Davis.' 4 The ova were fertilized with sperm from Junior
Davis.35 Two days later, two of the embryos were implanted in Mary
Sue, but did not result in pregnancy.'
The remaining seven embryos
were placed in cryogenic storage for the purpose of future
implantation.37
In February of 1989, the couple .filed for a divorce.38
Traditionally, divorce proceedings determine the equitable distribution of
marital property and the custody rights of parents, according to state
law.39 This marital dispute, however, was unique because the couple
"owned" seven frozen embryos stored in the laboratory of Drs. King and
Shivers.A
The Davis' divorce proceeding became the first case in
American courts that considered the disposition of frozen embryos.41

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. The fact that the embryos can be stored for future implantation eliminates
,the need for the physically and emotionally painful procedure of extracting eggs from
a woman each time in vitro fertilization is attempted. See Note, Frozen Embryos:
Moral, Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1084 (1986)
[hereinafter Note, Frozen Embryos].
34. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 5.
35. id.
36. Id.
37. id.
38. id. at 6.
39. See Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifly States: An Overview, 16 FAM.
L.Q. 289 (1983).
40. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 6.
41. Id.at 1.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WITH RESPECT TO FROZEN EMBRYOS

A. Right to Childbearing and Procreation
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized individual
In Meyer v.
autonomy in matters concerning childbearing. 42
Nebraska,' the Court defined the "liberty" of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment to encompass "establishfing] a home and
bring[ing] up children."" The Court explained that "[family] liberty
may not be interfered with [by] legislative action which is arbitrary or
without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
state to effect." 45 For example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,' the
Court held that a statute which required students to attend public school
rather than private school was unconstitutional. 4 7 The Court has
consistently upheld the right of individuals to make fundamental decisions
that shape family life, without government interference. 48 The Court has
held that states cannot regulate whom to marry, whether and when to have
children, and with what values to rear those children.49
The right to family autonomy also encompasses procreation. In
Skinner v. Oklahoma,' the Court held a statute which mandated
sterilization for "habitual criminals" was unconstitutional."1 In doing so,
the Court announced that procreation is "one of the basic civil rights of
man. "52 Although Skinner was decided before in vitro fertilization was
42. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381. U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a statute which
prohibited any person, including married couples, to use any form of contraception);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a statute which required
students to attend public school, permitting them to attend private school).
43. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
44. Id. at 399. In Meyer, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute which prohibited
the teaching of any language other than English in private or public schools. Id. at 403.
45. id. at 399-400.
46. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
47. Id. The underlying rationale in Pierce was that the family should have
autonomy with regard to matters concerning child rearing. Id. at 534.
48.

Id.

49. id.
50. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
51. Id. at 541.
52. Id. Skinner overruled a previous Supreme Court decision, Buck v. Bell, which
upheld a statute requiring certain habitual criminals and feeble minded people be
sterilized. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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possible, the fundamental constitutional right to have offspring announced
in Skinner may be broad enough to encompass the right to noncoital
procreation.
B. Right Not to Procreate
In 1965, the Supreme Court expanded privacy rights, with regard
to autonomy in family matters, to include the right not to procreate. 3
In Griswold v. Connecticut,' the Court struck down a statute which
prohibited the use of any contraceptive and counseling to use
contraception.5" The right to contraception was extended to unmarried
couples in Eisenstadt v. Baird,5 6 where Justice Brennan espoused an
expansive view of procreative liberty. 7 "If the right to privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free of
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.""8
From Eisenstadt and Griswold, it is evident that couples, married
or unmarried, have a right to autonomy in matters concerning
reproduction.5 9 In 1973, the Court's ultimate expression of individual
autonomy and procreative liberty was handed down in Roe v. Wade.'
In Roe, the Court held that the fundamental right of privacy is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy. 6'
Although Roe does not stand for the proposition that a woman has a right
to terminate pregnancy whenever she wishes, the decision dramatically
limits a state's right to regulate abortion.62
Under this broad protection of procreative liberty, it could be
argued that individuals have the constitutional right to choose any form of
procreation, coital or noncoital, for the purpose of bearing a child.
However, it does not necessarily follow that the state has no interest

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
id.
Id.at 485.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Id.at 453.
Id.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 153, 155.
Id.at 155.
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For example, a state

may have an interest in regulating fertilization centers for the purpose of

protecting the donor's health and rights.'

A more difficult issue is

whether a state may regulate in vitro fertilization on the grounds that it
desires to protect the "potential life" of the human embryo.
C. The State's Interest in Protecting "Life"

In Roe, the Court determined that a woman may have an abortion
until the third trimester of gestation, at which point the viability of the
fetus provides the state legislatures with a compelling interest in protecting
the life of a fetus.'
"[Slubsequent to viability, the State in promoting
its interest in the potentiality of human life may . . . regulate, and even
proscribe abortion except where it is necessary .... for the preservation
of the life or health of the mother, . . . '

Roe arguably stands for the proposition that the state does not
have a compelling interest in protecting the life of a fetus until the fetus
is considered viable.67 If the state does not have a compelling interest

in protecting a fetus until viability, it follows that a state would not have
a right to protect the potential life of a frozen embryo. A frozen embryo,
normally consisting of eight cells, is substantially less developed than a
fetus. Further, it would be inconsistent with the procreative liberties
63. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
64. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:128 (West 1991).
Only medical facilities meeting the standards of the
American Fertility Society and the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists and directed by a medical doctor
licensed to practice medicine in this state and possessing specialized
training and skill in in vitro fertilization also in conformity with the
standards established by the American Fertility Society or the
American- College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists shall cause the
in vitro fertilization of a human ovum to occur.
: I
Id.
65. The Roe Court defined viability as the "point at which the fetus becomes
'viable,' that is, potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial
aid." Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. Viability normally occurs at 24-28 weeks during gestation.
Id.
66. Id. at 164-65.
67. Id. at 162-63. Alternatively, it may beargued that Roe does not stand for the
proposition that the state has no compelling interest in protecting the fetus until viability,
rather that the woman's right to terminate pregnancy outweighs the rights of a fetus. Id.
at 162.
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articulated by the Court for a legislature to mandate that a frozen embryo
be implanted in a uterus in an attempt to bring it to term.6'
However, it is also arguable that Roe does not preclude a finding
that a state has a compelling interest in protecting the fetus even before
The Roe Court dealt with unwanted pregnancy and had to
viability.'
balance the interest in protecting fetal life against women's constitutional
Applying this balancing test, the Supreme Court
privacy rights.'
concluded that the mother's privacy rights outweighed the nonviable fetus'
rights." Under this analysis of Roe, a state does have an interest in
protecting life from the moment of conception. The state's interest in
fetal life must simply be weighed against the rights of the woman
involved. The frozen embryos could merit legal protection since they
have potential life and are not "stored" within a woman's body. Thus, a
mother's privacy rights could -be found not to outweigh the state's interest
in protecting the embryo. However, this analysis does not take into
account the mother's interest in preventing implantation of the embryos
in a surrogate mother, nor the psychological and emotional impact of
unwanted offspring. Under this view, donor-parents could be forced to
have biological offspring, despite the constitutional right not to
procreate."
The point at which a state may have a compelling interest in
protecting potential life has been further clouded by the recent Supreme
Court decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 3 Although,
in Webster, the Court did not hold that a state may constitutionally protect
all fetal life, it upheld a statute which declares "the life of each human
being begins at conception" and mandates that the statute be interpreted
to provide the unborn with "all the rights and privileges, and immunities
available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state. 4 In
68. Id.at 163 (for discussion of procreative liberties).
69. See Andrews, supra note 15, at 362; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
70. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120, 160-63.
71. Id.at 163.
72. See Robertson, Resolving Disputes Over Frozen Embryos 4-6 (May 17, 1989)
(unpublished article).
73. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
74. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205 (1989). In Webster, the Supreme Court did not rule
on the constitutionality of this provision. The Court stated that, until the federal courts
address the meaning of this provision of the statute, it was "'not empowered to decide
• . .abstract propositions, or to declare, for the government of future cases, principles
or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before
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Webster, the Court upheld legislation that prohibited the use of any state

funds for abortion and the use of state employed physicians in performing
abortions." Webster is significant because it implies a retreat from the
Roe standard of protecting potential life only at the point of viability.7'
Further, by refusing to address or comment on whether state legislatures
can declare "when life begins," Webster also signaled a retreat from
absolute procreative liberty.'

Neither Roe nor Webster address a crucial question raised by the
advent of frozen embryos, that is, when life begins. Roe simply states

that "[the Court] need not resolve the difficult question of when life
begins."'
In Webster, the Court intimates that a state may have a
compelling interest in protecting a fetus from the moment of conception,
but still does not specifically announce when life begins. 79 The question

of when life begins is a vehemently debated topic among courts,
legislatures, physicians, philosophers, and theologians.' Some scientists
and doctors argue that embryos are "undifferentiated" cell masses that
cannot be distinguished one from the other and do not resemble "unique
individuals." 8 In coital reproduction there is a naturally high loss rate
of embryos.82 It is estimated that of the eggs that are fertilized,
"between 40% and 78% ...will fail to implant or, if implanted, will not
it."' Webster, 492 U.S. at 507 (quoting Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration,
179 U.S. 405, 409 (1900)). In doing so, Webster overruled the appellate court decision
which constitutionally invalidated this provision of the statute. Id. at 522. Webster
stated in dicta that a state may declare when life begins as long as it does not impose
substantive restrictions on abortions. Id. at 521. This is significant because it
contradicts dicta from Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 444 (1988), which states that "a State may not adopt one theory of when life begins
. ...
"Id. Webster implies a retreat from the Roe v. Wade standard of not permitting
the states to declare policy of protecting life before viability. Webster, 492 U.S. 490;
see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
75. Webster, 492 U.S. at 490-96.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
79. Webster, 492 U.S. at 504-07.
80. See Cahill, In Vitro Fertilization:EthicalIssues in Judeo-ChristianPerspective,
32 LOY. L. REV. 337 (1986); Note, Frozen Embryos supra note 33.
81. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 8 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library).
82. Dickey, supra note 1, at 322-23.
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continue to grow and will be [naturally] aborted. '' n The potential life
of an embryo is uncertain. Under current case law, a state's compelling
interest in protecting potential life increases with the viability of. a
fetus." Scientific evidence demonstrates that the potential life for frozen
A state should not have the same compelling
embryos is minimal.'
interest in protecting the potential life of an embryo as it does a fetus
because the natural survival rate for an embryo is minimal.
Moreover, it is argued that viability is a flexible time frame that
should not be used to determine when life begins.' One commentator
argues that since intelligence is what distinguishes us from animal life,
human life should be determined, at least for the purpose of state
intervention, at the point of "fetal development when neocortical brain
activity begins.""7 The argument advances the theory that the existence
of "[electroencephalograph waves (EEG)] is an understandable and
accepted measure of brain death to the lay public, so can this same
measure serve as a realistic and objective measure for defining the
beginning of protected human life." 88 Under this theory, a less flexible
time frame of "when life begins" is established. It follows that an
embryo, since it has no EEG, 9 is not within the state's interest of
protectable life.

83. Id. at 322.
84. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64.
85. "Nationally [in vitro fertilization's] so-called take-home baby rate is under 10
percent." Bowermaster, The Baby Maker, MANHATTAN, INC., Nov. 1989, at 84, 88.
"[One physician, Dr. Rosenwaks of New York is] getting close to the natural conception
rate, which is around 25%." Id.
86. It has been argued that viability is not a biologically fixed time. Neonatology
technologies could advance the point of viability to earlier gestational ages. In Roe the
Court stated that viability included the ability to live outside the mother's womb,
including the "life sustained by artificialaid." Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added).
87. Note, Brain Birth: A ProposalforDefining When a Fetus is Entitledto Human
Life Statuts, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1986).
88. Id. at 1068. "Intelligence is the characteristic which makes the human species
unique from all other creatures, and it is neocortical activity that endows human beings
The human neocortex begins producing
with higher intellectual functions.
electroencephalograph (EEG) waves between the twenty-second and the twenty-fourth
weeks of pregnancy." Id. at 1061.
89. Id. at 1061.
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D. Rights of the Frozen Embryo

There is no consensus as to the proper approach to an embryo's
rights; the rights of embryos have been discussed in an array of cases
ranging from tort actions' to constitutional law questions. 91 Some
courts have even considered embryos to be property.'
Under this
theory, it has been argued that the embryo is the property of the donors
which should be divided under the state's equitable distribution laws. 9
It is unlikely, however, that this view will prevail when considering the
disposition of embryos. 94 One commentator summarizes the legal status
of the embryo in regard to constitutional rights, criminal law protection,
and civil law protection, by stating that "the property approach has not
been accepted as a satisfactory framework within which to analyze the
legal status of the embryo, but neither has the personhood approach been
'
so accepted." 95
The courts have not as yet accorded constitutional
protection to frozen embryos and the Supreme Court has never considered
the issue.9
The common view is that embryos are closer to potential life than
mere human tissue and should be treated with due respect.97 This view
does not advocate that embryos should be treated as persons, but that the
embryo deserves greater respect than accorded to human tissue. 9 From
90. Del Zio v. The Presbyterian Hosp., No. 74 Civ. 3588, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
14, 1978). In Del Zio, the plaintiffs alleged conversion in regards to the destruction of
cyropreserved embryos. Id. at 5.
91. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
92. Del Zio, No. 74 Civ. 3588, slip op. at 7. The court upheld a verdict of
conversion where a hospital destroyed cyropreserved embryos. Id. at 12; see also York
v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). In York, the court held that a husband and
wife were entitled to bring an action in detinue against a medical college to obtain
possession of their cyropreserved human embryos. Id. at 427. The requirements for an
action in detinue is that the plaintiff must have a properly right in the thing sought to be
recovered. Id.
93. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 16 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept.
21, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allstates lbrary).
94. HEW, supra note 13, at 44 ("[A] human embryo is entitled to profound respect;
but this respect does not necessarily encompass the full legal and moral rights attributed
to persons.").
95. Andrews, supra note 15, at 368.
96. See Andrews, supra note 15.
97. Alternative Reproduction Hearing, supra note 23, at 135.
98. Id. "[W]e know intuitively that a human embryo is more valuable than a kidney
and of much more symbolic importance regarding human life .... " Id.
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a Judeo-Christian perspective, it is argued that "the embryo is from
fertilization a human individual, a human life, without being a human
person in the full moral sense. . . . Thus, the conceptus demands
recognition, respect, and even protection." '
Under this philosophical
view of the embryo, protection should be accorded."° This view of the
embryo prevails throughout ethical standards of the medical 1°' and
legal"° profession. A review of the cases reveals that courts accord
human embryos with more respect than mere property, but less respect
than the rights of a born child." ° Presently, human embryos remain in
legal limbo, suspended somewhere between the two extreme positions of
being treated as property and being afforded the protection of human
rights. In determining the rights of embryos, courts should balance the
respective rights of the donor-parents, the embryos, and the state's right
to protect potential life.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DAVIS CASE
In Davis v. Davis,"' a Tennessee court was faced with
determining the legal disposition of frozen embryos and the rights of their
respective ova and sperm donors.0" In brief, the couple had seven
frozen embryos stored at a fertility center." ° The couple filed for a
divorce and disagreed about what to do with their embryos. 7 The
plaintiff, the donor-father, desired to prevent implantation of the frozen
embryos, so that he would not be forced into parenthood after the
divorce. 8 The defendant, the donor-mother, wanted to proceed with
99. Cahill, supra note 80, at 349 (emphasis in original).
100. Id.
101. See American Fertility Society, Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization,
FERTILrrY & STERILITY, Jan. 1984, at 12, reprinted in Human Embryo Hearings, supra
note 24, at 46.
102. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 17 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21,
1989) (WESTLAW, Allstates library).
103. See Andrews, supra note 15.
104. No. E-14496, slip op. (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept 21, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allstates
library).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 6.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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the implantation of the frozen embryos despite the divorce." ° Unlike
the situation in Australia where the embryos were left "orphaned, " " the
Davis court had to determine the fate of the embryos with respect to the
parents' disagreement.
A. Arguments for Implantation of the Embryos
Defendant Mary Sue Davis argued that the court should permit
her to implant the embryos regardless of the divorce."' Ms. Davis
based her argument on two principles, property law 1 2 and child custody
law."' Ms. Davis did not contend that the embryos were children in
the traditional meaning of the word, however, she argued that the
embryos had the potential of becoming human life and that this fact
distinguished them from property." 4 Ms. Davis requested that the court
adopt a sliding scale approach, with property at one end of the spectrum
and persons at the other end." 5 Under this approach, the frozen
embryos are "much closer to being 'property' than to being
'persons'."" 6 Because the embryos are closer to property, they should
be subject to the equitable distribution statute under Tennessee law." 7
Ms. Davis argued that, under the equitable distribution laws, she should
receive the embryos because her contribution to the "property" was much
greater; the process of extracting eggs from a woman's body is much
more discomforting than the man's sperm donation process."11
The assertion that the embryos are property is based on analogies
109. Id.
110. See Saltarelli, supra note 17, at 1030-33.

111. Brief Submitted on Behalf of the Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff at 14, Davis
v. Davis, No. E-14496 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allstates library)

[hereinafter Defendant's Brief].
112. Under the family laws of Tennessee, marital property must be distributed
equitably, thus, the relevant issue is each party's contribution to the property. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-4-121 (1989).
113. Under Tennessee child custody law, the focus is on the best interest of the
child, when the adult and child are in conflict. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-101 (1989).
In this case, the issue is what is in the best interest of the embryos.
114. Defendant's Brief, supra note 111, at 13.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 13-14.
118. Id. at 16 (the property referred to is the human embryos).
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drawn from several cases. In Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital,"9 a
hospital refused to implant the frozen embryos in the mother and then
destroyed them." z The donor-parents brought suit against the hospital
on grounds of conversion and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.121 The jury was instructed by the court on both causes of
The instruction on conversion implies that the court
action. "
recognized that the embryos were property which could be converted;
additionally, the jury based its verdict solely on conversion."
In asserting that the embryos were property, Ms. Davis also relied
on the conclusions of the American Fertility Society, the leading medical
organization involved with in vitro fertilization."
The Society stated
that "the gametes and concepti are the property of the donors."'
Although the opinion of the American Fertility Society is not legally
binding, it may be considered persuasive authority because the Society's
opinion would be considered expert in the field of reproductive
technology."
From the language of the ethical statement it is evident
that the American Fertility Society believes that the embryos are
"property" in the sense that the donors should have the ultimate control
of the disposition and implantation of the concepti."' In contrast,
however, the American Fertility Society does not conclude that the
embryos are property in the traditional sense of the word, but that "the
human embryo is entitled to profound respect. '12' Thus, the ethical
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

No. 74 Civ. 3855, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978).
Id.at 2-3.
Id.at 1.
Id.at 8.
Id.
Defendant's Brief, supra note 111, at 3.
Id. (quoting American Fertility Society, Ethical Statement on in Vitro

Fertilization, FERTILITY & STERILITY, Jan. 1984, at 12, reprinted in Human Embryo

Hearings, supra note 24, at 46) (emphasis added).
126. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 2, 11 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library).
127. Defendant's Brief, supra note 111, at 3. The ethical statement provides that
"[t]he donors ...have the right to decide at their sole discretion the disposition of these
items, provided such disposition is consistent with the medical and ethical guidelines."
Id.(quoting American Fertility Society, Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization,
FERTILITY & STERILITY, Jan. 1984, at 12, reprintedin Human Embryo Hearings,supra

note 24, at 46).
128. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 11 (quoting American Fertility Society,
Emerging Consensus on Pre-embryo Status, FERTILITY & STERILITY, Sept. 1986).
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statement advocates that the embryos should be given a higher status than
mere property. 129 Reading both statements to be consistent with one

another, it is unlikely that the Society desired that embryos be considered
property to be distributed under equitable distribution laws. The Society
has given no indication as to what should be done with the embryos when

the donors disagree as to their disposition.
The typical view of property is that an owner has complete
dominion and control over it, and may destroy it at will." 3° However,

Ms. Davis argued that embryos are not typical property which may be
destroyed at will, rather the embryos are to be treated with the utmost
respect even though they are "property."''
Legislation passed in
Australia'32 and Louisiana' prohibits the intentional destruction of an

embryo because of the death of the parents or for any other reason."
However, these statutes do not provide that embryos are to be treated as
personal property.' 35
Ms. Davis argued that, according to the statutes in Louisiana, she
would prevail because she was not seeking to intentionally destroy the
embryos. '6 However, the Louisiana statute had never been subjected
to constitutional scrutiny.'3 7 More importantly, the Louisiana statute
129. Id. at 10-11.
130. Property is defined as "[tlhat dominion or indefinite right of use or disposition
which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects. BLACK'S LAW
DIcTIONARY 1095 (5th ed. 1979).
131. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 10-11.
132. Infertility Act 1984, 1984 Vict. Acts no. 10,163.
133. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (West 1991).
134. Defendant's Brief, supra note 111, at 5-7; see Infertility Act 1984, 1984 Vict.
Acts no. 10,163; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (both statutes prohibit the intentional
destruction of human embryos; however, the statutes do not address the question of what
to do with the embryos in the case of divorce or disagreement).
135. id.
136. Defendant's Brief, supra note 111, at 6.
137. Id. at 7. The Louisiana statutes could be attacked on various constitutional
grounds. For example, if the state does not permit destruction of an embryo, it may be
deemed unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with the present abortion laws. See
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.1 (West 1990). In essence, the Louisiana embryo
statute does not permit donors to make a decision to terminate a "pregnancy" prior to
implantation. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129. It would be inconsistent to allow a
woman to implant an embryo but once the embryo has become a fetus permit her to
terminate the pregnancy. However, assuming that the Louisiana embryo statutes are
constitutionally valid, the defendant has persuasive authority to demonstrate that
American legislatures that have considered the new reproductive technology do not
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was mere persuasive authority and was not binding upon the Tennessee
court. Tennessee had no statutes specifically regulating the care and

disposition of embryos.
In addition to referring to Lousiana's statute, Ms. Davis also
argued that Mr. Davis had already consented to the pregnancy by agreeing
to fertilize her eggs. She reasoned that he could not revoke his consent

at this point. 3 " When a woman becomes pregnant, the father cannot
revoke his consent;' 39 it is not permissible for the father to force a
woman to terminate a pregnancy."

Similarly, a father cannot force a

woman to carry a child to term."'

Only the woman, in conjunction

with her physician, can make the decision to terminate her pregnancy."

2

After the father has consented implicitly or explicitly and a woman is
pregnant, the reproduction choice is left entirely to the woman." 3 In
Davis, the question was whether consent may be revoked after the

fertilization of embryos, but before implantation.'" Ms. Davis argued
that Mr. Davis had consented to the pregnancy, even though she was not
pregnant and the embryos remained frozen." 5 Because there was no
agreement to terminate the embryos upon divorce, the court could have
concluded that Mr. Davis had already consented to procreation and that
his consent could not be revoked after the creation of fertilized embryos.

permit intentional destruction of the human embryos.
138. Defendant's Brief, supra note 111, at 8. Ms. Davis acknowledged that couples
should have a right to coital, as well as, noncoital reproduction. Id. at 10. 'However,
she contends that the plaintiff, her husband, had already consented to the reproduction
of children by the fact that he consented to have the eggs fertilized and implanted in an
attempt to impregnate her. Id. at 8. Ms. Davis argued that the court should look to Mr.
Davis' actions to determine his intentions. Id. at 11. As the facts indicate, Mr. Davis
repeatedly attempted to procreate. Id. However, for a court to conclude that the
plaintiff has already consented to the pregnancy where the woman is not actually
pregnant may be contrary to a logical analysis.
139. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69-72 (1976)
(invalidating a Missouri statute requiring prior written consent of the spouse of the
woman seeking to terminate a pregnancy).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 69.
142. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973).
143. The woman has the ultimate control to abort or carry the child to term at least
until the third trimester. See id. at 162-67.
144. Davis, No. E-14496, slip 6" 'at 6-7 (Tenn. 'Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library).
145. Defendant's Brief, supra note 111, at 14.
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B. Arguments for both Donors' Consent before Implantation
The plaintiff, Mr. Davis, argued that the embryos should not be
considered "persons" under the laws of the state and federal government,

but are property in the sense that the donors should have the right to
control their disposition. " This argument is from the perspective of
M

parental rights, including the constitutional right to control one's own
reproductive life.147 Although this seems to be logical and is soundly
based in precedent, this case is infused with many moral and ethical

questions that may appeal to the emotions of a judge and jury, who might
look for an alternative solution. Therefore, arguments based upon total
control of the donor-parents may not prove certain. 4"

Mr. Davis asserted that pre-embryos are not considered persons
with an independent legal standing under the Constitution. 49 In Roe,
the Court held that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the
Constitution." Further, an embryo would have less rights than a fetus
since it is "considerably less developed anatomically than a fetus."''
Therefore, Mr. Davis argued that because the embryos are not legal
persons, their rights should not be considered and the rights of the donors,
146. Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Statement of Issues at 2, Davis v. Davis, No.
E-14496, slip op. (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allstates library)
[hereinafter Plaintiff's Brief]. Assuming that embryos are not considered persons under
the applicable state and federal law, the plaintiff argues that the embryos should not be
considered children under the child custody laws. Id. It seems that both the plaintiff's
counsel and defendant's counsel agreed that the embryos are not children which would
be subject to child custody laws. However, the opinion of the Davis court held that the
embryos should be placed under the doctrine of parens patriae which is used to
determine custody of children in divorce cases. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 7. For
a statement of the Tennessee courts' application of the doctrine of parens patriae see
Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834, 839 (Tenn. 1988).
147. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 146, at 3-6.
148. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 16.
149. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 146, at 1.
150. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157-58 (1973). It can be argued that Roe did not
stand for the proposition that a fetus is without constitutional protection, but rather that
the privacy rights of the mother outweigh those of the fetus in the case of an unwanted
pregnancy. Id. at 163-64. However, it is generally recognized that a fetus is not
considered a person under the protection of the Constitution. id. at 159.
151. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 146, at 1.
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alone, should be at issue in this litigation. 152
Mr. Davis argued that just as both parties must consent before
fertilization of the embryos, both parties must consent before
implantation. 53 He asserted that both parties in the case of in vitro
fertilization have a fundamental right to control their reproductive
life."
Mr. Davis further argued that the rights of the donor-parents
should outweigh any concern the state has in protecting the embryos, 55
and pointed out that this is the position taken by a prominent legal scholar
in the field of reproductive technology." s The proper resolution of this
dispute, in Mr. Davis' view, requires a balancing test between rights of
both donors to control their reproductive life.' 57 In the case where one
of the donors wishes to avoid reproduction, the gender of the party should
not be a controlling factor.'
Instead, the party who desires to avoid
reproduction should always prevail:' 59
A reasonable argument can be made that in the
absence of joint agreement the party wishing to avoid
reproduction should prevail over the party wishing to
reproduce because their loss will be greater. Their loss
is greater because the party who wishes to reproduce will
have other opportunities to do so, while the party wishing
to avoid reproduction has been irreparably injured."w
It is recognized that either party could desire to avoid
reproduction.' 6 ' Here, Mr. Davis desired to prevent Ms. Davis from
152. Id. at 4. Mr. Davis supported this argument by noting that the pre-embryos
are not considered persons under Tennessee law. Id. at 2. He refers to the mandatory
death reporting requirement, TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-504 (1989) and Tennessee's
criminal abortion statutes TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201. Plaintiffs Brief, supra note
146 at 2. From these two statutes it is evident that a fetus less than three months of age
does not have the equivalent rights of a person under state law. Id.
153. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 146, at 4.
154. Id.
155. id.at 6.
156. Id. at 5 (quoting Robertson, supra note 72, at 18).
157. Id.at 6.
158. Id.at 5.
159. Id.(quoting Robertson, supra note 72, at 18).
160. id.(quoting Robertson, supra note 72, at 18).
161. Id.at 6.
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having the embryos implanted, or transferred to a surrogate mother.16 2
But it could easily be reversed and the donor-father could desire to have
the embryos preserved and transferred to a surrogate mother even though
the donor-mother desires to have the embryos disposed. The underlying
argument is that the person desiring not to have offspring has a controlling
interest, and that person's gender should not be considered by a court of
law. "3
This argument is further strengthened by an analogous statute, the
Tennessee anatomical gift statute."
Under this statute, unanimous
consent from the next of kin is required when deciding whether to donate
any of a decedent's organs."& Mr. Davis did not contend that organs
are the moral equivalent of embryos, but that unanimous consent should
similarly be required in cases of embryo disposition.
Therefore,
under this view, Mr. Davis' refusal to consent to the implantation of the
embryos should have prevented the court from disposing of them in a
manner adverse to his will.
The argument to require both donors' consent before implantation
of embryos is furthered by the irreparable psychological and financial
damage that may occur when implantation of embryos produces unwanted
offspring. 67 Tennessee divorce law is not capable of relieving the
donor-father of any financial obligation or any custodial rights that may
arise should the embryos be brought to term. " ' Further, the court
cannot terminate any potential inheritance rights or prevent a child from
"seeking out the [donor-father] in years to come in an effort to establish
an emotional or psychological bond." 1 These considerations, coupled
with the constitutional right to control reproductive life, weigh in favor of
allowing the party who does not want the offspring to decide the fate of
the embryos.

162. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op: at 6 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library).
163. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 146, at 5.
164. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-30-102 to 68-30-103 (1989).
165. Id.§ 68-30-103(c).
166. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 146, at 4.
167. Id.at 6.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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C. Comment on the Trial Court Opinion
1. The Question of "When Life Begins ". - In Davis, the trial court was
presented with the question of whether embryos are human life or whether
they are property that may become human life. "7 The court found that
human life begins at conception.' 7' In its opinion, the court stated that
the plaintiff and the defendant "have accomplished their original intent to
Thus, it can be
produce a human being to be known as their child.'
concluded that the court not only considered the embryos human life but
it took a further protective step by referring to the embryos as children.
This raises the constitutional question of whether a court can
decide at what point life begins. In Roe, the Supreme Court stated in
dictum that "[w]e need not resolve the difficult question of when life
begins . . . those trained [in] -medicine, philosophy, and theology are
unable to arrive at any consensusi the judiciary, at this point in time in the
development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to
the answer.""7 The conclusion reached by the Davis trial court seems
to be in violation of this principle; however, considering new scientific
discoveries" 4 and a more recent Supreme Court decision"' the court's
opinion may be valid.
First, the knowledge of the scientific community may shed light
on the question of when life begins. Indeed, much of the trial court's
opinion rested on expert testimony, particularly that concerning the recent
discovery of DNA testing. 176 In finding that the embryos are human
170. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 16 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library).
171. Id. at 2, 17.
172. Id. at 17.
173. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (emphasis added).
174. DNA fingerprinting indicates that scientists may be able to tell the make up
of a human from only a few cells. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 13-14.
175. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
176. In Davis, expert testimony was provided to offer opinions to facilitate the court
in determining when life begins. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 7-15. Four of the
experts testified that the embryos were life. Id. at 7. "mhe human embryos are in
'being'; that is, in 'existence; conscious existence; as, things brought into being by
generation .... or living, alive." Id. at 8. Three other experts disagreed, stating that
the embryos are not human life but simply have the potential for life. Id. Dr. Shivers
and Professor Robertson were among the experts who testified that the embryos were not
human life. Id. One of the their arguments for the opinion that embryos are not human
life is that they are "undifferentiated cells." Id. "Undifferentiated cells" means that
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life, the court relied heavily on the expert testimony of Dr. Lejeune, a
specialist in human genetics.177 Dr. Lejeune produced evidence that the
embryos are "especially differentiated," that is, a scientist could
The process which Dr.
distinguish one zygote from another zygote.'
Lejuene relies on is a highly technical DNA profiling, often referred to
as "genetic fingerprinting."'" Dr. Lejuene testified that when the ovum
is fertilized, or at the moment of conception, manipulation of the DNA
molecules of human chromosomes provides a picture of the human who
will develop from the embryo." s He stated that "upon fertilization, the
entire constitution of the [person] is clearly, unequivocally spelled-out,
including arms, legs, nervous systems and the like; that upon inspection
via DNA manipulation, one can see the life codes for each of these
otherwise unobservable elements of the unique individual."181
In upholding the reliability of DNA profiling, the trial court relied
on Andrews v. State of Florida'" as persuasive authority. 113 In
Andrews, the Florida District Court of Appeals upheld the reliability of
"genetic fingerprinting" or DNA profiling as evidence to convict a suspect
in a sexual battery case." The Andrews court held that DNA profiling
was scientifically sound and thus admissible into evidence.' 85 The Davis
trial court held that the test was valid evidence to determine whether
embryos are differentiable cells."8 6 The fact that the trial court relied
on scientific knowledge to determine when life begins may stand for the
proposition, consistent with Roe, that scientific knowledge has evolved to
the point where the beginning of life can be determined scientifically.
Secondly, the trial court's conclusion that life begins at conception may
rest on the Supreme Court's more recent decision in Webster v.
there is no way to distinguish between the cells. Id.
177. Id. at 13, 14.
178. Id. at 13.
179. Id. at 14. For a general discussion of DNA fingerprinting see Note, DNA
"Profiles'-The Problems of Technology Transfer, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 183
(1990).
180. Id. at 15.
181. Id.
182. 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
183. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 14 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library).
184. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 842.
185. Id.
186. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 14.
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Reproductive Health Services.8 7 In Webster, the Supreme Court
interpreted Roe's inconclusive definition of life as meaning that "a State
could not 'justify' an abortion regulation otherwise invalid under Roe v.
Wade on the ground that it embodied the State's view about when life
begins."188 Webster upheld language in a statute which provided that
"[t]he life of each human being begins at conception," and that "[u] nborn89
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being."'
After Webster, it may be possible for a state to determine when life begins
as long as it does not use the definition to regulate abortion that would
otherwise be constitutionally protected under Roe. 90
The trial court noted that Webster "leaves open the door for a
state to establish its compelling interest in protecting even potential human
life by legislation declaring its public policy."'

Although the

Tennessee legislature has not enacted legislation that indicates the state's
policy of protecting potential life, the court held that the common law
demonstrated the state's interest in protecting the unborn." To reach
this conclusion, the court cited Smith v. Gore,"° a wrongful life action
resulting from a failed tubal ligation, in which the discussion of public
policy revealed that the state places a great value on human life." 9
Citing the Gore court's conclusion that Tennessee's policy is to greatly
value human life, the Davis court held that it would extend this policy to
include the protection of frozen embryos since there was not state
legislation to the contrary. 95
2. The Trial Court Conclusion: Embryos Subject to Parens Patriae.
The trial court held that the embryos are human life, not property. 19
The court did not subject the embryos to property laws, specifically the
187. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
188. Id. at 506.
189. Id. at 504-05 n.4.
190. Webster, 492 U.S. at 514-15 (permissible for Missouri to statutorily mandate
preabortion testing for fetal viability at twenty weeks gestation); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (viability in a fetus begins at the 24th-28th week of gestation).
191. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 22 (Tenn. Cir. Ct., Sept. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library).
192. Id.
193. 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1988).
194. Id. at 747-48.
195. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 20.
196. Id. at 21.
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equitable distribution laws which are used to divide marital property, 197
but rather, to child custody law and the doctrine of parens patriae. 98
Under this doctrine, the court determined the fate of the embryos by

examining what is in their "best interest."'"

This doctrine is commonly

used in deciding to whom to grant custody of children in divorce
cases.'
The court took a position extremely protective of the embryos

by treating and referring to them as "children."" 1 "The court is of the
opinion, finds and concludes that the age-old common law doctrine of
parens patriae controls these children, in vitro, as it has always

supervised and controlled children of a marriage at live birth in domestic
relations cases in Tennessee." '

Because the donor-father objected to

any implantation of the embryos, the court concluded that it is in the "best
interest" of the embryos to grant custody to the donor-mother so that the
embryos may be allowed the possibility of live birth and survival.'
D. Criticism of the Davis Trial Court Decision
1. Unanswered Questions. - The rule laid down by the Davis trial court
is to protect the best interest of the embryos.'
However, this rule
leaves open a series of questions that will inevitably arise in future cases
197. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121 (1988).
198. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 7. The court defined parens patriae as "the
power of the sovereign to watch over the interests of those who are incapable of
protecting themselves." Id. The doctrine ofparenspatriaeis most commonly expressed
as the "best interest of the child doctrine" and its sole objective is "justice for the child."
Id. In the ease of in vitro fertilization this might more accurately be stated as the best
interest of the embryos doctrine. Id. at 19.
199. Id. at 20.
200. See Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981). In Beck, the court
discussed, in some detail, the doctrine of the best interest of a child in a custody case.
Id. For further discussion of the best interests of the child doctrine see Apel, Custodial
Parents, Child Sexual Abuse and the Legal System: Beyond Contempt, 38 AM. U.L.
REV. 491, 507 (1989); Taylor, Making Parents Behave: The Conditioning of Child
Support and Visitation Rights, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1071 (1984).
201. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 20. The court repeatedly referred to the
embryos as children throughout the opinion. Id. For example, "[tihe Court respectfully
finds and concludes that it further serves the best interest of these children for Mrs.
Davis to be permitted the opportunity to bring these children to term through
implantation." Id. (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
203. Id. at 20.
204. Id.

1991]

NOTES

407

For example, if the trial court's rule is
concerning frozen embryos.'
followed, it may preclude the enforcement of donor's contracts regarding
the disposition of embryos. A donor contract providing that the embryos
shall not be implanted, in the case where both donors die, would be
contrary to the best interest of the embryos and arguably
unenforceable."
The Davis trial court rule, best interest of the embryos, may be
difficult to determine in some instances. Is it always in the best interest
of the embryos to have an opportunity for live birth? For example, if it
is found that the embryos in question have genetic defects, such as a
genetically transmitted disease or mental retardation, some courts may not
consider it in the best interest of the embryos to be implanted for possible
life.
In other circumstances, the psychological welfare of the
embryo/child may be called into question. For example, if the donormother of the embryos desires to have the embryos thawed to die and the
donor-father desires to have the embryos implanted in a surrogate in an
attempt to bring the embryos to term, it may be considered in the best
interest of the embryos to grant custody to the donor-father. The embryos
would then be implanted in a surrogate mother. If the embryos are
brought to term, it would raise further custodial questions and concern for
the psychological well-being of the children.2 7 Further, if the embryos
are implanted in the donor-mother and she becomes pregnant, the courts
cannot force her to bring the embryos to term; she retains the option to
terminate the pregnancy, until the point of viability." 5 Thus, in a
situation where the mother is likely to terminate a pregnancy, it is
arguably not in the best interests of the embryos to implant them.
If the court truly wants to protect the interests of the embryos, it
must assume the responsibility of finding a woman who will give the
205. Scholars recognize that the disposition of the embryo should be left to the
control of the donors. Robertson, supra note 72. Moreover, constitutional cases dictate
personal autonomy in family matters. See supra notes 42-67 and accompanying text.
206. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 20 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library). In Davis, the court acknowledged that the state's public
policy was to protect life. id. at 7. Since the embryos were considered life, they should
be protected regardless of the circumstances. Id.
207. See In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). In Baby M., the
Supreme Court of New Jersey invalidated a surrogate mother contract because it was
contrary to public policy. Id. at 434, 537 A.2d at 1246. The court expressed concern
over the psychological well-being of the child. Id. at 441, 537 A.2d at 1250.
208. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
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embryos the highest possibility for a successful birth. For example, if
Woman X had only a one percent chance of bringing the embryos to
term, but Woman Y has a fifty percent chance of bringing the embryos
to term would the court have a right to grant the embryos to Woman X?
It would certainly be in the best interest of the embryos to be implanted
in a mother that would have a high success rate for birth.
As
demonstrated, application of the Davis rule, best interest of the embryos,
will be difficult and in some situations violative of the donor's procreative
liberty.
E. Comment on the Opinion of the Appellate Court
The appellate court modified the lower court decision on a number of
grounds.
While the trial court awarded "custody" of the embryos to
Mary Sue Davis and directed that she "be permitted the opportunity to
bring these children to term through implantation, 2 10 the appellate court
awarded "joint custody" and directed that both parties "share an interest
in [disposition of] the seven fertilized ova."2"
It must be noted,
however, that the factual context of the trial had changed by the time that
the case had reached the appellate level; both Mary Sue and Junior had
married other spouses and neither party wanted a child with the other as
the parent. 2 2
The most significant difference in the appellate court's opinion is that
it recognized Mr. Davis' constitutional right not to procreate. 213 By
holding that the parents should be granted joint custody of the embryos
the court, in effect, determined that both parties should have a say in the
disposition of frozen embryos regardless of gender. "[Dieciding that
Junior [Davis] may be required to become a parent against his will, [is]
denying him the right to control reproduction. ''21 4
The decision
recognized that both parties involved in the in vitro fertilization have a
209. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, slip op. at 4, 5 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library).
210. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 20 (Tenn. Cir. Ct., Sept. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library).
211. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, slip op. at 6 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library).
212. Id. at 2.
213. id. at 4.
214. Id.
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constitutionally protected right to prevent procreation." 5 Thus, while
the trial court protected the rights of the embryos, the appellate court
protects the constitutional rights of the donor-parents. 2 6
The appellate court also overturned the portion of the trial court
decision which held that embryos were essentially human life.2" 7 The
court stated that "[t]here are significant scientific distinctions between
fertilized ova" and an embryo in a mother's womb. 2 8 Further, the
court held that the Tennessee legislature does not accord the same
protection to embryos as it does to viable fetuses. 219
F. Better Alternative Rule: Donor Consent as Implied Contract

The Davis trial court seems to have based its conclusion that the
embryos should be granted to the mother on outmoded paternalistic
notions that the mother should have custody of children. While the
appellate court recognized the procreative liberty of the father, it never
directly answered the question as to what should be done with the
embryos in the case of disagreement. If the courts intended to grant
custody of the embryos to the mother or to both parents jointly, it would
have been more logical to hold that the donor-father had already
consented to having a child when he underwent infertility treatment to
fertilize the eggs. In effect the consent to fertilize the eggs would be
regarded as creating an implied contract. This would leave the option for
donors to explicitly form a contract in which the disposition of embryos
was set out in advance. This rule would protect the procreative liberty of
an individual and, at the same time, elevate the status of the embryo.'
215. "[The court has clearly held that an indi'idual has a right to prevent
procreation. The decision whether to bear or beget a child is a constitutionally protected
choice." Id. at 2 (quoting Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977)).
216. Id.
217. The trial court held that embryos were essentially human life based upon
scientific evidence. See supra notes 170-95 and accompanying text.
218. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library).
219. Id. at 5.
220. In the Davis trial court decision, the fact that the woman was awarded custody
of the children may reinforce the anti-feminist notion that the woman's role in society
is to procreate. See WADLINGON, WHITEBREAD & DAVIS, CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL

SYSTEM 649 (1983).

If the court determined that the consent of both parties was

necessary before implantation, it may reinforce the notion that both men and women
participate in the reproductive decisions of child bearing.
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In the instant case, the donor-father consented to the technique of
having the embryos frozen for the purpose of having a child."~' The
court could have considered this consent to be irrevocable. Just as it is

too late to revoke consent when a woman has become pregnant, it may be
too late to revoke consent after a man has undergone the process of sperm
donation for in vitro fertilization. If the Davis court had used the consent
of Mr. Davis as a basis for granting custody of the embryos to Ms.
Davis, then subsequent decisions by courts could have merely upheld the

intent of the parties as an implied contract. However, this was not the
route taken by either Davis court.
The Davis rule also rejects the notion that a couple who has
several embryos frozen with the intent of having only one child will be
able to terminate the life of the remaining embryos2 2 Under the first
Davis rule, if the donor-mother was successful on the first attempt of
implantation to become pregnant and seven embryos remained, the donorparents would not have the option to discard the remaining embryos, since
that would not be in the embryo's best interest. A possible result of the
holding is that the state would have to take control of the embryos and
place them for adoption. 2' If a state were required to find a surrogate
mother to bring the embryos to term, it would make the fertility treatment
of cyropreservation considerably less attractive for couples; there would
always be the possibility of unwanted offspring.' 4 Further, under the
The appellate court, on the other hand, did recognize that both parties have a
voice in determining the fate of their embryos. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, slip op. at 5,
6 (Tenn. App. Sept 13, 1990) (WESTLAW, Allstates library). However, it may have
been easier for the appellate court to reach this conclusion since Ms. Davis, the donor
mother, no longer wished to have the embryos implanted. Id. at 3.
221. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at 5 (Tenn. Cir. Ct., Sept. 21, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allstates library).
222. Id. at 20.
223. At the present time an embryo can only be frozen for two years. Therefore,
it raises the question as to whether a woman who became impregnated by one embryo
could leave the remaining embryos cyropreserved for a period longer than two years;
in effect, intentionally destroying the embryos by omission. The Davis court stated
"mhe uncontroverted testimony is that to allow the parties' seven cryogenically
preserved human embryos to remain so preserved for a period exceeding two years is
tantamount to the destruction of these human beings." Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at
24, 5 (Tenn. Cir. Ct., Sept. 21, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allstates library).
224. If the state were required to find the remaining embryos a surrogate mother,
the donors would have the psychological burden of having a natural offspring somewhere
in the world unbeknownst to them. The current Louisiana statute provides:
If the in vitro fertilization patients express their identity,
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Davis trial court rule, if the donor-parents both died, the state could have
the obligation of finding a surrogate mother for implantation if that were
feasible and deemed to be in the embryos' best interest.
If the best interest doctrine is applied to embryos, a court could
arguably apply this same doctrine to fetuses. For example, if medical
technology were to advance to a point where the fetus could be removed
from a mother and implanted into the uterus of another woman, a court
could force a woman to have an unwanted fetus removed and implanted
in the uterus of another woman who desires the baby. This would
certainly be in the best interests of the fetus without imposing the
unwanted burden of pregnancy upon the biological mother.
The
permutations of applying the best interest doctrine to embryos and fetuses
are limitless. A court can never truly protect the best interests of an
embryo in every situation without infringing upon the procreative liberties
of a couple. To comport with the principles of procreative liberty as
espoused by the Supreme Court,' the Davis court should have based
its decision on donor consent or implied contract. This would allow more
flexibility and permit the parties to agree and contract in advance to
reproducing by in vitro fertilization.
While the appellate court
recognized the donor-parents constitutional right not to procreate' it
did leave open questions which may arise. Such a question could arise in
a situation where the donor-mother wished to implant the embryos in an
effort to bring them to term and the donor-father wished to give the
embryos to a surrogate recipient. Assuming that both donor-parents did
not want the embryos to be thawed or to "die," then, in this case, the
disposition of the embryos would again be complicated because the parties
could not agree upon disposition as required. Thus, the appellate court's
decision would essentially leave the parties in the same predicament as
they were before the case had been decided; that is, if the parties cannot
agree upon disposition the embryos would be left to thaw and "die."
Again, application of the implied contract rationale would provide for
clearer guidance in resolution of these disputes.

then their rights as parents as provided under the Louisiana Civil
Code will be preserved. If the in vitro fertilization patients fail to
express their identity, then the physician shall be deemed to be
temporary guardian of the in vitro fertilized human ovum until
adoptive implantation can occur.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN.

§

9:126.

225. See supra notes 42-64 and accompanying text.
226. Id.
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III. CONCLUSION

A. Need for Reproductive Technology Legislation
The innovative reproductive technology of in vitro fertilization,
specifically the cryopreservation of embryos, makes it necessary for state
legislatures to determine the public policy with regard to frozen embryos.
The rate of infertility is rising"' and as a result the demand for
infertility treatment will also increase.2"
It is imperative that the
legislature act quickly to determine the legal status of an embryo and the
rights of the respective donor-parents.
Constitutional procreative liberties, which protect individuals from
unwanted offspring and the accompanying burdens, should be given great
weight by the legislature. ' 9 Keeping in tradition with the Constitution
itself,' the legislature should grant as much individual freedom as
possible in drafting legislation concerning new reproductive techniques.
If legislation is to be enacted, it should permit infertile couples to
procreate and raise their own children and at the same time protect
individuals from being forced into having unwanted children.
At the present time only one state, Louisiana, has legislation
concerning the human embryo and reproductive technology. 3 ' The
Louisiana legislation defines the human embryo as a "juridical
person." 2 The statute provides that a human embryo is solely for the
purpose of utero implantation and their sale for use and research is
prohibited. 3 Under the Lousiana scheme, a human embryo is not
property and cannot be owned,'
nor can it be intentionally
destroyed. 5
Each state will eventually have to draft legislation
227. See Dickey, supra note 1, at 317.
228. See generally Bowermaster, supra note 85, at 84.
229. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
230. See supra notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
231. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-33 (West 1991).
232. Id. § 9-125.
233. Id. § 9-122.
234. Id. § 9-126.
235. Id. § 9-129. Most importantly, the statute provides that in the case of disputes
arising between any parties regarding the human embryo, the judicial standard for
resolving such disputes isthe best interest of the embryo. Id. § 9-131. These statutes
have not been subjected to constitutional scrutiny by a court of law. There are numerous
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regarding the reproductive technology, and each state will be forced to
espouse its public policy regarding the legal status of an embryo.23
B. Proposalfor In Vitro Fertilization Legislation
Legislatures should permit the donors to determine the fate of
their embryos in the case of disagreement or death rather than subject the
embryos to the doctrine of parens patriae.z '
This proposal for
legislation would permit couples to determine the fate of the embryos in
the case of disagreement, eliminate the probability of potential disputes,
and foster constitutionally protected rights.
1. Require an Agreement Before Cryopreserving Embryos. - Legislation
should require that couples using cryopreservation to store embryos must
enter into an agreement which states the fate of the embryos in the case
of disagreement, death, or divorce." s The legislation should also
require that doctors counsel the donors so that'any contract will not be
void due to lack of mutual consent. The legislation should further provide
for a waiting period for the couples to contemplate the contract provisions
concerning disposition of the embryos before they actually consent, sign,
and undergo fertilization and storage.
2. Determining the Policy of the State. - Legislation will have to
determine the state's policy with regard to the legal status of embryos.
The status of the embryo should be one of utmost respect: considerably
higher than mere human tissue but less than the rights of a fully developed
person. This standard would permit donors who have had a successful
implantation to thaw the remaining embryos so that they would not be
implanted into another woman's uterus.
3. Prohibit the Sale of Embryos. - Legislation should prohibit the sale
of embryos. This provision will serve to elevate the status of the
embryos. If embryos were permitted to be sold they could be regarded
arguments, particularly infringement upon procreative liberties, against the use of the
"best interest" doctrine to control the disposition of embryos in the case of disagreement.
See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
236. See Note, Needfor Statutes, supra note 5, at 1064-65.
237. See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of
parens patriae with respect to in vitro fertilization).
238. Robertson, supra note 72, at 7-8.
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by the public as property, thus degrading their legal status. It will also
prevent men and women from freezing embryos for the sole purpose of
selling them, thereby creating a "market" for frozen embryos.
4. Limit the Number of Embryos that May Be Frozen. - Legislation
should limit the number of embryos that a donor couple would be
permitted to store by cryopreservation.
By limiting the number of
embryos that are stored for each donor couple, disputes will be reduced.
More importantly, if a couple has a successful implantation and embryos
remain, the number of embryos remaining would be small. Therefore,
destruction of the remaining embryos would be similar to the ratio of
embryo waste that takes place in natural reproduction.239
5. Relieffrom ParentalResponsibilities. - Legislation should relieve the
donors from all parental responsibilities that may arise in the case where
a transferred embryo is brought to term. For example, if the donor
couple agrees to place remaining embryos for adoption or if the donor
couple agrees that, upon disagreement, one of the parties would have
control of the embryos, the legislation should relieve the non-parenting
donor from any financial burdens, custody, or inheritance which may
arise if the embryos are brought to term.
The new reproductive technology of cryopreservation of human
embryos raises multiple legal and moral questions. This Note has only
touched the tip of the pyramid of questions which will result from
disagreement in the disposition of frozen embryos.
In suggesting
legislation, this Note implies that the state may justifiably regulate the new
technology. However, it advises that procreative liberty should be
maintained in order to encourage these new reproductive techniques. This
new technology should not be viewed as a threat, rather, it must be
viewed as a beneficial means through which infertile couples may
procreate children of their own.
Anthony John Cuva
239. See generally Dickey, supra note 1, at 320.

